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Abstract 
Do populist rule lead to more politicization? As populists have had electoral success in many 
countries in recent years, populism has received much attention both in the public debate an in 
political science. One aspect of the concept, how populists act once in power and how they 
relate to the state bureaucracy has however, so far, received only little attention. Populists 
have been suggested to increase the politicization of the public bureaucracy, i.e. the degree of 
political involvement in the careers of bureaucrats, as populists are untrusting of the 
establishment and seek to increase their control of the state. This thesis uses time-series cross- 
section data from Europe and Latin America to test whether populists increase politicization 
more than others when in power. The results show a positive relationship between populist 
rule and politicization and suggest that the effect is driven by populists on the fringes of the 
left-right spectrum. Previous research has found that systems characterized by intense 
politicization are less resistant to corruption and preform worse on good governance 
indicators. Therefore, these results indicate that the current populist wave may have hidden 
implications for the bureaucratic performance of the effected countries. 
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“…today we are not merely transferring power from one Administration to another, or from 
one party to another – but we are transferring power from Washington, D.C. and giving it 
back to you, the American People. […] What truly matters is not which party controls our 
government, but whether our government is controlled by the people”. 
 
Donald Trump’s inaugural address (White House, 2017) 
 
“I urged the new cabinet members to move quickly to replace holdover bureaucrats with 
people who believed in what we were trying to do. […] [I warned that] if we don’t get rid of 
those people, they will either sabotage us from within, or they’ll just sit back on their well- 
paid asses and wait for the next election to bring back their old bosses”. 
Richard Nixon (1978) 
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Introduction 
Do populists increase the politicization of recruitment to the bureaucracy when they come 
into power? There are examples that suggests that they would. In Hungary, Prime Minister 
Orbán’s populist Fidesz party has undertaken extensive reforms of the state bureaucracy. 
Including increasing the Prime Minister’s power to make appointments to the central 
administration, a power the government has been accused of using to politicize the 
bureaucracy, filling it with politically loyal civil servants (Bauer & Becker, 2020; Hajnal & 
Csengodi, 2014). Similarly, in the US, President Trump has been accused of using political 
appointments more extensively than his predecessors and reassigning “unreliable” bureaucrats 
to peripheral positions (Bauer & Becker, 2020; Peters & Pierre, 2019) And in Sweden, the 
Sweden democrats have, at the municipal level, been accused of blurring the line between 
politics and the bureaucracy (Aftonbladet, 2020). A defining feature of populism is the 
division between the good people and the corrupt elite and the goal of populists is to 
empower the people by taking control of the state and substituting the influence of the elite on 
the state’s institutions and policies with that of the people. Populists are majoritarian and 
believe that the will of the majority should have free rein and influence all matters of the state. 
Therefore, they are expected to try to increase the level of politicization when in power as 
they believe that even the bureaucracy should be subject to direct political control. Populists 
mistrust the bureaucracy whose pluralist ideals run counter to those of populism. Populists 
will try to change the bureaucracy by replacing its members with their own loyalists in order 
to increase their control and implement institutional change. The pluralistic bureaucracy’s 
attempts to uphold its traditional ideals in the face of a populist government is likely to be 
regarded as resistance which may increase politicization efforts even more. 
Politicization of the bureaucracy means that political criteria rather than merit becomes the 
norm of recruitment to the bureaucracy (Peters & Pierre, 2004:2). Political appointments can 
be a means of keeping the bureaucracy accountable to the public but if it becomes the norm 
for hiring personal in general it has been suggested to lead to loss of competence as more 
qualified candidates are passed over by politically loyal ones (Peters & Pierre, 2004, 2019; 
Lewis, 2008). This can reduce the effectiveness of the bureaucracy, hurt its legitimacy in the 
eyes of the public and diminish the government’s ability to implement policy (Peters & 
Pierre, 2004:4; Moynihan & Roberts, 2010; Meyer-Sahling & Jager, 2012). Further, 
politicization has been said to alter the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, 
which may expose bureaucrats to pressure from politicians to bend the rules or engage in 
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corruption (Miller, 2000). In a politicized bureaucracy the careers of politicians and 
bureaucrats become linked, while the opposite, a professional bureaucracy separates their 
careers and sets up different chains of accountability (Dahlström & Lapuente, 2017). This 
separation of careers has been said to deter illicit behaviour in both groups and has been 
associated with higher quality of government, lower levels of corruption, higher bureaucratic 
performance and better conditions for private business (Dahlström et al, 2012; Miller, 2000; 
Meyer-Sahling et al, 2018; Charron et al, 2016; Nistotskaya & Cingolani, 2016). 
Populism has attracted increased interest in recent years, much as a result of populist parties 
having electoral success in Europe, governing in, Hungary, Poland, Italy and elsewhere, 
breaking new ground in places like Sweden and Germany as well as making the presidential 
run-offs in France. And in the Americas countries like Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru and 
more recently the US and Brazil have seen populist presidents. In political science, interest in 
populism has among other things been concerned with explaining populism as a political 
phenomenon (Mudde, 2004, Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012, 2017; Inglehart & Norris, 
2017) and its effect on democratic institutions (Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Levitsky & Loxton, 
2013; Hubert & Schimpf, 2016; Houle & Kenny, 2018; Ruth, 2018, Ruth-Lovell et al, 2019). 
There has also been ample attention payed to politicization as a phenomenon as well as its 
potential effects (Peters & Pierre, 2004; Lewis, 2008; Dahlström et al, 2012; Miller, 2000; 
Meyer-Sahling et al, 2018; Charron et al, 2016; Nistotskaya & Cingolani, 2016). 
How populists actually govern when in power and how they relate to the bureaucracy 
however, has largely not been address at all, only recently has there been contributions that 
have begun to examine this link (Peters & Pierre, 2019:1524; Rockman, 2019; Bauer & 
Becker, 2020). These works have however, largely been focused on developing theory and 
producing expectations about the effect populist rulers may have on the bureaucracy. Beyond 
observations about individual cases there has been no empirical test of populism’s 
relationship to the bureaucracy and whether populists in power increase politicization more 
than others. 
In this master’s thesis I examine populism’s effect on the bureaucracy and provide an 
empirical test of this relationship by combining data on populists in power and politicization 
using two new dataset, both which has become available only in the last year. One covers the 
tenures of populists in power in Europe and Latin America between 1995 and 2018 (Ruth- 
Lovell et al, 2019) and the other consists of expert survey data on the level of politicization 
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from the Varieties of democracy project (Pemstein et al, 2020). I also examine whether 
different ideological strains of populism have different effects. Even though populism has a 
long history there has been relatively few cases of populists in office. Now however, with the 
developments in Latin America and Europe over the last 25 years there are, for the first-time 
sufficient cases and complied data to empirically test this relationship across the two 
continents that has been the most affected by populism so far. By combining this new data on 
populists and politicization, this thesis offers a unique opportunity to empirically examine the 
populist effect on politicization. 
My analysis shows a positive relationship between populists in power and the level of 
politicization. The result bares out the theoretical expectations among scholars which has 
previously not been tested. The analysis of the different direct effects of populists’ ideological 
leanings suggests that effect is driven by populist actors on the fringes of the left-right 
spectrum and particularly by far-right populists. These results suggest that, as populist actors 
gain political influence in more and more countries, scholars, policy makers and citizens, need 
to pay attention to the developments of the norms that govern the public bureaucracy. Over 
time, populist rule may change the norms that has dominated most modern bureaucracies and 
replace them with more direct political control and put politics over merit. This could weaken 
the affected political systems resistance to corruption and reduce their quality of government. 
The next chapter defines the thesis’ central concepts and lay out the theoretical expectations. 
After this I elaborate my research problem and present my hypothesises. This is followed by 
the methods section where I describe the data and statistical techniques used. After this I 
present the results which are then discussed in a separate chapter. The last chapter offers some 
conclusions and suggestions for further research. 
 
 
Theory 
Populism as a political phenomenon has a long history, one of the earliest examples are the 
American populist movement of the nineteenth century, which challenged the two-party 
system seeking to unite the interests of rural agrarian people against the economic and 
political elites (Rooduijn, 2014; Urbinati, 2019). A populist who was early to hold power was 
Argentina’s personalistic president Juan Perón who have been followed by many other 
populist leaders in Latin America, most recent is the wave of left-wing populists that started 
with Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. In Europe, populism has mainly been associated with the 
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political right, from neo-liberals such as the early Progress party in Denmark, to nationalists 
such as the National Front in France. The 2016 election of President Trump in the US, the 
Brexit referendum and the rise of populist parties in many European countries has contributed 
to making populism one of the most talked about and important political concepts today 
(Thomson, 2017; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Mudde; 2019). Having often been used 
as a derogatory term about political policies and opponents deemed as un-serious (Mudde 
2004: 542-3), today there is even a strong movement, particularly on the left, of self- 
identifying populists (Mouffe, 2018; Venizelos & Stavrakakis, 2020). In the following 
sections I present definitions of populism and politicization and ley out the arguments and 
theoretical expectations about why and under what circumstances populists are expected to 
increase politicization when in power. 
 
 
Defining populism 
Populism can take on many different forms, in the media and every-day conversation the term 
has been used very broadly and about a variety of different phenomenon (see Mudde & 
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017:1-5). This can give the impression of a word that, while surrounded 
by buzz and dark skies, has little meaning. In the political science literature, there has at times 
been just as much inconsistency, as there has been many different attempts to define populism 
(Rooduijn, 2014; Canovan, 1981; Ionesco & Gellner, 1969; Laclau, 1977). The task of 
defining the term has even been called “defining the undefinable” (Mudde, 2004:523) and 
scholars have disagreed on what it is and whether to regard is as an ideology, a discourse, a 
movement, a style of politics or something else (Mudde, 2004; Rooduijn, 2014). 
Today, one of the most widely accepted views of populism is the so-called ideational 
approach, that is, populism as a set of ideas (Mudde, 2017; Rooduijn et al, 2014). It is an 
attempt at a non-normative definition that does not make assumptions about populism’s 
relationship to democracy, can be inclusive and useful for comparisons and that can travel 
across contexts (Mudde, 2017; Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Urbinati, 2019). Here, I define 
populism using one of the most accepted definitions within the ideational approach, it comes 
from Cas Mudde and defines populism as: “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately 
separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the 
corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale 
(general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004:543). 
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This minimalistic definition is useful as it allows for the inclusion of populist actors of 
different ideological leanings and across both time and space, united by these core 
characteristics. At the same time, it separates out those who are not populist. Traditional 
parties and others who sometimes use populistic discourse but do not hold the people-elite 
conflict as their main concern are left out of the definition. 
Being a “thin-centred ideology” populism can be combined with other full ideologies such as 
socialism or nationalism, but in itself, populism is neither left nor right (Mudde, 2004, 
2017:30). Central to populism is the conflict between the people and the elite, populism is 
moralistic and regards the difference between the people and the elite as a normative one 
where the elite have allowed themselves to be corrupted and betrayed the pure people 
(Mudde, 2004, 2017:30). 
Exactly who the elite and the people are can vary with different strains of populism, nativist 
populists may have a more exclusionary ethnic definition while socialist populists may 
employ a more inclusionary class-based definition. Regardless, the two groups are always 
defined in opposition to each other. According to Mudde (2004) populists have a majoritarian 
understanding of democracy as well as a Manichean outlook, meaning that to them everything 
is either black or white, friend or foe. Populists see themselves as the only true representatives 
of the popular will, therefore, political opponents may be seen as illegitimate as, in the eyes of 
the populists, they make false claims about representing the people and the popular will. 
Jaroslaw Kaczyński, leader of the Polish populist Law and Justice party (PiS) statements 
about his critics as traitors and “Poles of the worst sort” (Müller, 2016:45) can serve as a 
perhaps slightly extreme example of this dichotomous antagonistic view of opponents. 
 
 
Politicization 
Guy Peters and Jon Pierre (2004) have defined politicization of the bureaucracy as “the 
substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, 
rewards, and disciplining of members of the public service” (2004: 2).The “political criteria” 
can differ in its expression, in some cases it might mean party membership, in others it may 
be about loyalty to the government’s programs, its leader or ideology (Peters & Pierre, 
2004:2, 2019). According to the authors the term implies attempts to assert influence and 
control public policy and its implementation. Politicization is part of almost all political 
systems today but there are large differences between countries in regard to how much 
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influence politicians have over appointments and the degree to which the political or merit- 
based criteria are employed (Kopecký et al, 2016; Dahlström et al, 2012). In some countries, 
politically motivated appointments are common at all levels of the bureaucracy, in others they 
are only used for higher level positions such as agency heads and in others they are rarer still. 
As politicians are held responsible by voters on all manners of political outcomes, from 
healthcare to the economy to education, they have strong electoral incentives to try to control 
as much of the public policy generation and its outcomes as possible in order to appease 
voters expectations (Lewis, 2011). Political appointments are a way to try to exert such 
control over agencies and programs and produce the outcomes that politicians want, and 
voters expect (Lewis, 2011; Peters & Pierre, 2004:3,7; Moynihan & Roberts 2010:579). 
Appointments to the civil service bureaucracy is a legitimate part of governing a modern 
democracy, however, the model of the modern state has been to shield the bureaucracy from 
too much political influence in order to ensure its efficiency and impartiality (Peters & Pierre, 
2004; Rouban, 2012). Peters and Pierre (2004) claim that having politicization effect the 
entire careers of bureaucrats, is a much larger departure from the model of protecting the 
bureaucracy from politics than the substitution of only very senior bureaucrats as a result of 
electoral turnover. If political criteria guide entire careers, this will shape the norms of the 
bureaucracy and its relationship to politics to a larger extent and such systems will be more 
politicized than systems where the political criteria is used less frequently (Peters & Pierre, 
2004:3). 
 
 
Populism and politicization of the bureaucracy 
Why would populists politicize more than others? In this section I will present the main 
arguments why they would. In short, populists are expected to increase politization because 
they embrace majoritarian democracy and believe that the volonté générale should have 
complete influence over the state and its administration. Populists are antagonistic towards the 
elite and see the state and its bureaucracy as part of establishment and as a tool of the elite. 
The populist instinct to take full control of the state may be reinforced by their enmity 
towards the institutions of the elite and the bureaucracy’s attempts to uphold pluralistic 
constraints on their power. 
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Populism and the pluralistic bureaucracy 
Populism embraces majoritarian democracy which emphasize the implementation of the will 
of the majority, favours direct forms of government, embraces the idea of popular 
sovereignty, is critical of attempts to constrain the exercise of power and finds alien the idea 
that the majority should be limited by the rights of the minority (Plattner, 2010; Mudde & 
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Populism is contrasted by its opposite, pluralism (Mudde, 
2004:543), which regards society as heterogenous, made up by a variety of different groups 
and interests. In contrast to populism, pluralism is connected to the notion of liberal 
democracy rather than majoritarianism. Unlike populism, pluralism regards diversity as a 
strength rather than a weakness and opposite to the populist idea of a unconstrained volonté 
générale, the pluralist ideal is a system of compromise and restrictions where no one group 
can ever impose their will on others (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017:7-8). 
The modern democratic state shares the values of pluralism rather than those of populism, and 
it is the bureaucracy that upholds the state’s pluralistic ideals. The bureaucracy is in many 
ways a pluralist institution, bound by institutional restraints and made to uphold pluralistic 
ideals like impartiality, respect for minority rights and to exercise constitutional constraints in 
the day-to-day running of the state (Bauer & Becker, 2020). The bureaucracy’s pluralistic 
ideals and the idea that some parts of the state, such as the judiciary, central bank or the 
bureaucracy are to be kept from democratic influence and control puts the bureaucracy at 
odds with populism. This is because these ideals are not in line with the core populist 
ideology and understanding of democracy (Mudde, 2004:561; Müller, 2016:45) Populists 
believe that they, as the representatives of the people and the popular will, have the right to 
control all aspects of the state. They believe popular sovereignty to be the only legitimate 
source of power (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013:151). What matters to populists is that 
the people hold power, not the procedures or how power is exercised (Urbinati, 2019:122-3). 
Austrian populist leader Jörg Haider’s response to why he refused to comply with a court 
ruling regarding minority rights illustrates this point quite clearly, “- In a democracy, it is the 
will of the people that matters’, not that of the courts” (Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013:351). As 
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) writes: “As [ populism] tends to distrust any unelected 
institution that limits the power of the demos, populism can develop into a form of democratic 
extremism or better said, of illiberal democracy”. (2017:82, italics original). 
The populist focus on popular sovereignty means that populists do not share the pluralistic 
idea that the bureaucracy should be shielded from political control, rather they believe in 
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increasing the level of political control over it. Further, as populist do not agree with the 
pluralistic ideals that guides the bureaucracy they will try to purge it from its pluralism and 
encourage “democratic recruitment”, a popular takeover of positions in the bureaucracy and 
reforming the state to allow them to govern as they please (Peters & Pierre, 2019:1534; Bauer 
& Becker, 2020:21; Müller, 2016:44,67). This has been described as the populist will to 
occupy or capture the state (Bauer & Becker, 2020:21; Müller, 2016:44, 67). 
The idea of populist state capture has been borne out in a number of countries such as 
Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru, Hungary and Poland where populist governments have made efforts 
to change their countries constitutions, politicized the judiciary, eroded horizontal 
accountability and changed their civil service laws in order to strengthen their own control 
and limit the power the perceived elite (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013; Ruth, 2018; Hubert & 
Schimpf, 2016; Houle & Kenny, 2018; Bánkuti et al, 2012; Meyer-Sahling & Jager, 2012; 
Bauer & Becker, 2020; Mudde, 2019:128; Müller, 2016:45; Pappas, 2019; Albertazzi & 
Mueller, 2013) 
 
The populist instinct to take control of the state and politicize the administration may be 
reinforced by the nature and actions of the bureaucracy (Peters & Pierre, 2019:1533-6). 
Populists may regard a pluralistic bureaucracy as unresponsive to legitimate public demands 
and as an instrument to uphold the establishment status quo. Populists see themselves as the 
interpreters of the popular will and expect its full implementation (Mudde & Rovira 
Kaltwasser, 2017; Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013:348-9), which is why a populist government is 
likely to find itself frustrated when faced with a slow-moving, principal-abiding bureaucracy 
and expectations about swift reforms and the realization of their policies are not meet. The 
bureaucracy on the other hand may be resistant to comply with orders that run counter to its 
pluralist ideals. The opposition posed by the US administrative state to the attempts of 
populist state control from President Trump denotes that this is a likely response from the 
bureaucracy (Bauer & Becker, 2020:26-7). 
Such resistance has had Trump and other populists embrace the idea of the “deep state”, a 
shadowy expression of unelected establishment-bureaucrats with their own agenda acting on 
behalf of the elites rather than the people (Peters & Pierre, 2019; Bauer & Becker, 2020; 
Michaels, 2017; CNN, 2019). Opposition to their ideas is likely to reinforce the populist 
animosity towards the bureaucracy and the populist response may be to try to increase their 
control over the bureaucracy by politicizing it even further. 
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Politicization in practice 
This section presents theoretical arguments as well as examples of how politicization can and 
has occurred. Politicization is often a means to achieve control of the state administration but 
can, as we will see, also be used to sabotage the influences of one’s political opponents. 
According to Peters and Pierre (2004) increased politicization can be expected when there are 
large shifts in the nature of the policies of the state. As long as parties with similar ideologies 
and goals control the government, there is less of a need to politicize as policies and norms 
are similar. But when a different kind of political actor with fundamentally different views 
comes to power, they may use more extensive politicization in order to change the direction 
of public policy and reshape the bureaucracy (Peters & Pierre, 2004:8). Ideological 
differences between the bureaucracy and the governing party has been used to explain 
increased politicization by others as well, when there are ideological differences and lack of 
trust between government and administration, the incentives to politicize increases (Dickinson 
& Rudalevige, 2004; Moynihan & Roberts 2010; Lewis, 2008; Peters & Pierre, 2019:1528). 
In line with Peters and Pierre’s (2004) reasoning, Luc Rouban (2004, 2007) has argued that 
the level of politicization of the French bureaucracy increased when the Socialists won the 
precedency in 1981. The new Socialist government represented a large shift and saw the 
incumbent bureaucracy as occupied by the upper-classes and sought to transform it with party 
loyalist to make it more accepting towards their policies (Rouban, 2004:86, 2007:490). 
As populist in general see the bureaucracy and its members as part of the establishment and as 
devices for maintaining the interests of the corrupt elite it can be expected that the conflict 
stemming from the ideological differences between populists and the bureaucracy should lead 
to a similar increase in politicization. Populists associate the bureaucracy with previous rulers 
and the societal elites as it has been implementing their policies and are assumed to support 
them. Who populists consider the elites can, as mentioned, vary depending on the breed of 
populism, but the members of the bureaucracy will often be included as they are largely made 
up by educated people in the national or regional capitals with proximity to political power 
(Bauer & Becker, 2020:22). The East-coast or Washington-elites of the US and the graduates 
of the Ecole Nationale d’Administration whom have occupied the higher ranks of the French 
civil service are examples of the bureaucracy being associated with the elite (Peters & Pierre, 
2019:1529 ; Rouban, 2004). Peters & Pierre (2019) have argued that the bureaucracy’s 
association with the elite can make populists unrusting of it, leading them to take measures to 
fill the bureaucracy with as many loyalists as possible (2019:1528). 
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Populists can be expected to represent fundamental change when they come into power, they 
are political outsiders, anti-establishment and their ideas of governance runs counter to the 
pluralistic state and the ideals bureaucrats are used to abide by (Bauer & Becker, 2020). Their 
policies also differ fundamentally from those of traditional parties and they will want to exert 
their control in order to turn the ship of government. The ascent of Prime Minister Orbán’s 
populist Fidesz party to power in Hungary represented a remarkable shift from “business as 
usual” when they came into office for the second time in 2010 and their actions bare out Peter 
and Pierre’s predictions that large shifts in in the political leadership would be accompanied 
by increased politicization. The party have undertaken an ambitious populist reform agenda 
accompanied by an extensive politicization of the public bureaucracy in order to facilitate the 
redirection of state policy (Mudde, 2019:126-7; Bauer & Becker, 2020; Hajnal & Csengodi, 
2014; Müller, 2016:44). The Hungarian populist government has been able to use 
politicization to increase their control, but it can also be used to reduce the influence of the 
perceived elite. 
Bauer and Becker (2020) argue that, as US President Trump’s attempts of populist reform and 
dismantling of the American bureaucratic state to a large degree has been resisted, he has 
resorted to sabotage (2020:26-7). According to the authors, the combination of strong 
resistance from a stable institutional and political system and Trump’s anti-state, small 
government-ideology has had him using politicization to stop the pluralistic bureaucracy from 
working efficiently. Examples of this behaviour involve appointing a global warming sceptic 
as the head of the Environmental Protection Bureau and leaving many important positions in 
the government unfiled (Bauer & Becker, 2020:27). This can be seen as an attack on the 
pluralistic bureaucracy aimed at reducing the influence of the elite rather than directly 
furthering the president’s own control. So, populists may also use politicization in order to 
diminish the influence and sabotage the agenda of their perceived enemies rather than just to 
further their direct interests. 
 
 
Host ideology 
Huber and Schimpf (2017) have argued that what they call the host ideology of populist 
parties, i.e. their ideological leanings besides populism, needs to be taken in to account when 
trying to understand their behaviour and their actions. In this section I draw on the debate on 
the different properties of different kinds of populism and present my expectations about the 
effect host ideology may have on politicization. So far, studies that explore the effects of 
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populist rule on the state administration in general have been rare (Peters & Pierre, 
2019:1524-5) and even less is known about potentially different effects of populist’s host 
ideologies. 
There has for some time existed a debate among students of populism who have focused on 
the relationship between populism and democracy. This debate has been about whether 
populism is primarily an inclusionary force whose goal it is to increase the level and equality 
of political participation or an exclusionary force aimed at safeguarding influence for the “real 
people” while excluding others, such as immigrants (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013; 
Huber & Ruth, 2017). Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) have argued that populism can 
be both, depending on their host ideology. The authors maintain that inclusionary populism 
has been predominant among the far-left populists of Latin America, such as Chávez in 
Venezuela, while the, often nativist, radical right populists of Europe, like Le Pen in France 
embrace an exclusionary type of populism. 
Adding to this debate Ruth-Lovell et al (2019) have contend that the two sorts of populism 
may affect different aspects of democracy. Left-wing inclusionary populism was suggested to 
increase the equal distribution of rights, participation and resources among different segments 
of the population while exclusionary far-right populism would further the negative impact of 
populism on public discourse and increase polarization (2019:5). However, when Ruth-Lovell 
et al (2019) tested this claim, they found no difference between how far-left and far-right 
populists affect the quality of different models of democracy. 
What does this mean for politization? Well, there are reasons to believe that the ideological 
and inclusionary/exclusionary nature of the host ideology may affect how populists relate to 
the bureaucracy when in power. The more inclusionary left-wing populists value the 
participatory element of democracy even higher than other populists. Mass participation is 
their democratic ideal and democratic control of the entire state is incumbent in their populist- 
DNA. These populists will want to open all aspects of the state to previously un-represented 
groups and substitute the elites that has previously occupied them (Mudde & Rovira 
Kaltwasser, 2013:162). This includes not just the ministries and legislatures but also the state 
bureaucracy which should represent the entire people. Like the proponents of the “spoils 
system” in the US (Peters, 2004:123), they believe that politicization is a form of democratic 
control that keeps the government responsive to the people. This is true for populists in 
general but can be expected to be even more prevalent among left-wing populists and 
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particularly with the radical far-left populists of Latin America that emphasises participation 
and believes in “radical democracy” (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013:161). 
An example of far-left populism like this is the Chávez-Maduro regime’s in Venezuela. Even 
though their commitment to democracy has proven unsatisfactory, their partiality towards 
participation has led to several large-scale initiatives aimed at setting up participatory 
institutions that draw on otherwise marginalised groups, tasked with administering services 
such as healthcare and education (Hawkins, 2010:60,35-40). 
I expect that the inclusionary ideal that led to efforts to engage new people in social programs 
also acts to increase politicization of the bureaucracy as more emphasis is put on democratic 
recruitment - getting unrepresented groups into positions in the state administration. This 
leads to the expectation that left-wing populists will be more inclined to politicize than both 
centrist and right-wing populists who do not share this inclusionary streak. 
 
 
Research problem 
The previous sections have shown that populism is one of the most important political 
concepts today and that despite a lot of scholarly attention there is still not much known about 
how populists govern, particularly their relationship to the bureaucracy. I have argued why 
populists in power are likely to increase politicization more than non-populists and why far- 
left populists are even more likely than other populists to increase politicization. The aim of 
this thesis is to contribute to the research on populism by exploring it relationship to the 
bureaucracy in a quantitative study. Given the global rise of populist actors and what is 
known about the negative relationship between intense politicization and the quality of 
government, it is important to examine whether populists in power increase politicisation 
more than others. 
Hypotheses 
 
Based on the theoretical argument in the previous section I expect that: 
 
- Hypothesis 1: Populist governments increase the level of politicization more than non- 
populist ones. 
- Hypothesis 2: Far-left populist governments increase politicization more than other 
populists. 
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Methods and data 
The empirical analysis takes a quantitative time-series cross-sectional approach in order to go 
beyond what has already been done in the field. In the past, studies on populism, which has to 
a large degree focused the emergence of populist actors and their effects on aspects of 
democracy, have often been limited to individual countries or groups of countries (Levitsky & 
Loxton, 2013; Houle & Kenny, 2018; Ruth, 2018; Pappas, 2019). This includes the few 
efforts made to detangle populism’s relationship to the bureaucracy (Bauer & Becker, 2020). 
Here, the aim is to go beyond these intra-regional approaches and bridge the gap that has 
existed in much of the previous studies of populism between students of Latin America and 
Europe, two regions where quite different manifestations of populism has been prevalent 
(Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Rooduijn, 2014). This is done by conducting a cross- 
regional large-N analysis studying the effect of populist rule over time in both regions. Next, I 
will present the data used before describing the statistical techniques used in the analysis. 
Summary statistics of all variables can be found in Table A1 in the appendix. 
 
 
 
Operationalizations 
Politicization – Merit criteria 
The dependent variable politicization is operationalized using expert survey data from the 
Varieties of democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al, 2020). V-Dem uses country experts 
to produce data on a range of topics relating to democracy and governance, their data is held 
in high regard and is widely used. The indicator used here is the variable “Criteria for 
appointment decisions in the state administration1” (Pemstein et al, 2020) which measures to 
what extent appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal and 
political connections, as opposed to skills and merit. Lower values of the variable indicate 
more politicization and higher values indicate less, i.e. that merit is more prevalent as a 
 
 
1 The variable was first included in V-Dem version 9 (2019). There are some differences in the scores of some 
countries between this first version and version 10 (2020) which is used here. For instance, in v.9 Hungary has a 
score of 1.68 for the year 2018, in v.10 the nations score for 2018 is -0.15 and Peru’s 2018 score changes from 
0.3 in v.9 to 0.013 in v.10. For most countries, the differences are negligible. According to V-Dem, differences 
between versions can be due to them having included additional coders and/or coders may have changed their 
ratings based on new information. Here I use the latest version (v.10) of the dataset as this presumably is the best 
version according to the creators of the dataset. Re-running the analysis using v.9 shows similar results for my 
main analysis. 
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criterion for appointments. The indicator captures the de facto level of politicization as 
assessed by country experts rather than formal rules or policies. This is an advantageous way 
of measuring politicization as enforcement of formal rules may vary between countries as 
well as in countries across time. The meaning of politicization captured by this variable very 
closely matches Peters and Pierre’s (2004) definition of the concept which I use here. The 
variable describes the use of political criteria across the entire state bureaucracy rather than 
just the top level, which, as discussed in the methods section, is a better indicator of the level 
of politicization of the bureaucracy than the methods by which very senior officials are 
selected. 
 
 
Populism – Populist rule 
 
Previously, the study of populism across regions have been difficult due to the lack of 
consensus about which political actors should be considered populist and the lack of 
systematic data collection. Here I am able to move beyond these difficulties by utilizing a 
newly developed dataset on populists in power in Europe and Latin America. It was 
developed by Saskia P. Ruth-Lovel, Anna Lührmann and Sandra Grahn (2019) and combines 
data from three different datasets and identifies when populists have been in power. The data 
for Latin America comes from Ruth (2018) and identifies presidents that came to power using 
a populist discourse by using literary review and expert opinion methods. The European 
coding uses The PopuList (Rooduijn et al, 2019) which identifies populist parties in a number 
of European countries, this is then combined with data on when representatives of these 
parties were in power (Huber & Schimpf, 2016, 2017; Hubert & Ruth, 2017). The result is a 
dataset on populists in power that covers 462 countries between 1994 and 2018, the sample 
includes 282 separate tenures and identifies 28 populist and 239 non-populist individual 
presidents or prime ministers. In the dataset populism is a dichotomous variable indicating a 
populist chief executive, i.e. prime minister or president. 
All governments are also coded by ideology as being either far-left, centrist or far-right. The 
coding for Europe comes from the same source as the populist coding, Rooduijn et al (2019) 
and classifies parties as far-right if they are nativist and authoritarian, and far-left if they have 
 
 
2 Ruth-Lovel et al’s study covers 47 countries but their data covers a total of 48 countries. I include the 
additional country (Croatia) but exclude Iceland and Malta due to incompatibility with other variables used in 
the empirical analysis. 
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a radical left-wing economic policy. As Ruth’s (2018) dataset on populist presidents in Latin 
America do not contain classifications of leader’s host ideology, Ruth-Lovel et al (2019) 
supplement the coding of ideology using a dataset by Murillo et al (2010). This dataset 
classifies the ideology of Latin American presidents based on the economic policies they 
implement in office. Parties and leaders not classified as either far-left- nor right are coded as 
centrist, a broad category including moderate parties on both the left and the right as well as 
centrists and non-ideological parties. For instance, Nicaragua’s Sandinista President Daniel 
Ortega is coded as centre-populist while Hugo Chávez in Venezuela is considered a far-left 
populist and President Salvador Sánchez Cerén of El Salvador is coded as far-left non- 
populist. 
 
 
Control variables 
 
In order to capture the effect of populist in power on the level of politicization, I apply a 
number of control variables. These are based on the theoretical expectations and can be 
expected to effect both the presence of a populist government and the level of politicization. 
Previous studies that have studied the populist effect on democratic quality has found that 
democratic consolidation can moderate the negative effect of populists in power on 
democratic quality (Huber & Schimpf, 2016). Less consolidated democracies are also more 
likely to have successful populists (Huber & Schimpf, 2016:164). I expect that the more 
consolidated democratic institutions will be more resilient to attempts at politicization as the 
pluralistic institutions and norm of shielding the bureaucracy from political influence are 
more intrenched than otherwise. To control for the level of democratic consolidation I use 
data from Polity IV (Marshall et al, 2019) on the number of years since the last regime 
change. 
Economic prosperity of a country can be expected to affect the affluence of populist parties 
and is known to affect governance and the level of democracy, so I expect it to also affect the 
level of politicization. In order to control for the effect of economic prosperity I include an 
indicator of GDP per capita (in 2010 USD, logged) from the World Bank’s development data 
(2020). 
I also include a variable on region, Latin America, or Europe, as there are quite large 
differences between the two regions on the average level of politicization (Kopecký et al, 
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2016). The control for region may also capture institutional differences between the mainly 
parliamentary Europe and the Latin American presidential systems. 
The ability of populist to implement changes that increase politicization can be expected to be 
contingent on the level of control of the government. David E. Lewis’s (2008) works on the 
politicization of presidential appointments in the US has found that when the same party 
controls both the presidency and congress, the increase in politicization is larger than 
otherwise. According to the author, this is because when the interests of the two branches are 
aligned there is less resistance to politicization. Presidents who govern in face of an 
opposition-controlled congress on the other side, are more likely to have their appointments or 
requests to expand the number of appointees shot down. Although there are some debate on 
how party control of government effects politicization in different types of political systems 
(see Rouban, 2007:491; Dahlström & Niklasson, 2013:894-5) the expectation here is that 
parties with less control of the government will have a harder time making large institutional 
changes that facilitate politicization than those leading majority governments. 
I expect that since populists wants to take full control of the state, they will try to politicize 
the bureaucracy if they can. These attempts will be resisted by the opposition which do not 
share the same ideals and wants to uphold the pluralistic state. Populists who do not control 
both the executive and legislature will therefore have a harder time politicizing the 
bureaucracy while those in control of both will see no reason to limit their control of the state. 
To account for this, I include a control for divided government in the analysis. The variable 
used comes from V-Dem (Coppedge et al, 2020) and is called the Divided party control index 
and captures whether the same party or coalition controls both the executive and the 
legislature. Lower values signify unified control, higher values divided control while 
coalitions make up the middle range. 
 
 
Methods 
The aim of the empirical analysis is to study the effect of populist rule on the level of 
politicization across time using a sample of Latin American and European countries. The 
main analysis uses pooled ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression with panel-corrected 
standard errors (PCSE) (Beck & Katz, 1995) and include a lagged (t-1) version of the 
dependent variable. The lagged dependent variable is used because the level of politization in 
a country for any given year is expected to be strongly influenced by the value the previous 
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year (Mehmetoglu & Jakobsen, 2017:253-4). This dynamic model means that the results can 
be interpreted as the yearly change in the dependent variable. OLS with PCSE is a method 
designed specially to deal with the kind of data used here; time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) 
data, i.e. data where the same units are observed at several points in time. The method is a 
standard way of analysing time-series-cross section data and suitable for my analysis as I 
expect variation in my independent and dependent variable both within countries over time 
but also between countries. 
An alternative approach would be to use a fixed-effect model, but these are not suitable in my 
case as they remove the variation between countries and only test within country-effects. 
There is relatively little variation on my main independent variable Populist rule, as there are 
relatively few cases of populists in power. This means that it is important to choose a method 
of analysis that utilizes this variation as much as possible. Also, my research question is based 
on the expectation that there are differences between countries. A PCSE model can handle 
this while a fixed-effects model would remove the between-country variation and therefore 
weaken the explanatory power of the model. 
The more conservative fixed-effects approach is instead used as a robustness test to see if the 
results hold up when controlling for within country effects. So, after the initial analysis, the 
models are re-run using an alternative fixed-effects (within) regression with country clustered 
standard errors to test the robustness of the results of the OLS regression. The next section 
presents the results of the empirical analysis and the results are then discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 
 
Results 
The results of the empirical analysis can be seen in Table 1 and 2, the models in Table 1 tests 
the effect of populists rule on the level of politicization (Hypothesis 1) while the regression in 
Table 2 tests the direct effect of different host ideologies of populists in power (Hypothesis 2). 
As higher values of the dependent variable indicate less politicization the variable is referred 
to as Merit criteria in the tables to ease interpretation. The coefficient should be interpreted as 
the yearly change in the Merit criteria variable on populist rule. The same controls are applied 
for both analyses and are described above. Next, I will first review the results in Table 1 
before moving on to Table 2. The implications of the results are discussed in the next chapter. 
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Table 1. Populist rule and politicization – Main analysis 
 
 (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) 
Merit criteria      
Populist rule -0.0541*** -0.0542*** -0.0543*** -0.0543*** -0.0532** 
 (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0166) 
Merit criteria (t-1) 0.995*** 0.991*** 0.991*** 0.991*** 0.991*** 
 (0.00325) (0.00635) (0.00636) (0.00630) (0.00633) 
GDP/capita (log) 
 
0.00490 0.00472 0.00525 -0.000263 
  (0.00662) (0.00654) (0.00662) (0.00898) 
Divided party control 
  
-0.00309 -0.00308 -0.00220 
   (0.00371) (0.00370) (0.00357) 
Dem. Consolidation 
   
-0.0000472 0.00000966 
    (0.000113) (0.0000902) 
 
Region 
     
-0.0153 
     (0.0174) 
Constant 0.00977 -0.0328 -0.0307 -0.0344 0.0223 
 (0.00761) (0.0581) (0.0573) (0.0572) (0.0871) 
N 1129 1129 1129 1129 1129 
Countries 46 46 46 46 46 
Years (avg.) 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 
𝑅2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Ordinary least squares regression with panel-corrected standard-errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Reference for Region is Europe 
 
 
Table 1 shows the effect of the main independent variable Populist rule, meaning that there is 
a populist president or prime minister in power, the reference category for this variable is non- 
populist ruler. The control variables enter the analysis one by one and the full model can be 
seen to the far right (5a). None of the controls are statistically significant. The inclusion of a 
lagged (t-1) version of the dependent variable Merit criteria explains the considerably large R- 
squared value of all models in Table 1. This is because the inclusion of the value of the 
dependent variable from the previous year gives the model a lot of predictive power. The 
results in Table 1 show that the coefficient for Populist rule is negative, suggesting that 
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populist rule increases the level of politicization and decrease the prevalence of the merit 
criteria. The effect is statistically significant and in line with expectations. 
The effect of populist rule in the full model (5a) is, however, not very big, only about a 
twentieth standard deviation. As an example, Denmark which has the highest value on the 
variable in the sample scores 2.987 for each year in the time-series. A yearly change of - 
0.0532 as predicted by the results would change Denmark’s score to 2.455 over 10 years, a 
score which would still be the fourth highest average in the sample. The same ten-year effect 
of a -0.532 change can also be express as the difference between Sweden’s average value 
during the time-series and that of Poland before the onset of the current populist regime. Even 
if this is not a radical change it would still have an impact on how the bureaucracy functions 
and over time the norms of a political system may change and the balance between merit and 
politics be altered. 
The analysis seen in Table 2 tests the direct effect of far-left, centrists and far-right populist 
rule. Again, the centrist category is broad and encompasses all populists not considered far- 
left- or right, including such diverse political figures as Silvio Berlusconi and Daniel Ortega. 
There are quite few populist rulers in the sample who fall into the extreme categories, during 
the time period observed four countries had far-left populist leaders and only three had far- 
right populist leaders (see Appendix for list of countries). The expectation that the more 
inclusionary far-left populists increase politicization more than far-right and centrist populists 
is not supported by the results. They show negative coefficients for all three types of 
populists, but the results are only significant for the two extremes. The size of the effect of 
far-left populists in power is slightly larger than the general populist variable seen in Table 1 
while the effect of far-right populism is almost three times as large. This suggests that it is the 
two extremes and particularly far-right populism that is driving the effect observed in Table 1. 
The effect of far-right populists in power is quite substantial compared to the results in Table 
1, about one seventh of a standard deviation. The annual change predicted would have 
Sweden at the level of Costa Rica in five years and that of South Africa after 10 years. Again, 
when observing the results of Model 2 it is important to remember that there are few 
observations for each type of populist host ideology and that the inclusion of a lagged version 
of the dependent variable effects the R-square value. 
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Table 2. Populist rule and politicization – By host ideology 
 
 (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) 
Merit criteria      
Far-left Populist rule -0.0682* -0.0695** -0.0688* -0.0687* -0.0642* 
 (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0271) (0.0271) (0.0262) 
Centrist Populist rule -0.00177 -0.000499 -0.000928 -0.00100 -0.00102 
 (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0183) 
Far-right Populist rule -0.146** -0.146** -0.146** -0.147** -0.149** 
 (0.0563) (0.0560) (0.0559) (0.0559) (0.0554) 
Merit criteria (t-1) 0.995*** 0.990*** 0.990*** 0.991*** 0.990*** 
 (0.00355) (0.00660) (0.00661) (0.00656) (0.00661) 
GDP/capita (log) 
 
0.00651 0.00638 0.00710 0.00147 
  (0.00658) (0.00649) (0.00649) (0.00892) 
Divided party control 
  
-0.00170 -0.00169 -0.000916 
   (0.00376) (0.00376) (0.00375) 
Dem. Consolidation 
   
-0.0000646 -0.00000874 
    (0.000103) (0.0000836) 
 
Region 
     
-0.0155 
     (0.0167) 
Constant 0.00769 -0.0488 -0.0475 -0.0526 0.00523 
 (0.00796) (0.0578) (0.0569) (0.0562) (0.0869) 
N 1129 1129 1129 1129 1129 
Countries 46 46 46 46 46 
Years (avg.) 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 24.5 
𝑅2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Ordinary least squares regression with panel-corrected standard-errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Reference for Region is Europe 
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Table 3. Populist rule and politicization - Robustness check with alternative models 
 
Merit criteria (1c) (2c) 
Populist rule -0.283* 
 
 (0.136)  
Far-left Populist rule 
 
-0.367 
  (0.335) 
Centrist Populist rule 
 
0.0797 
  (0.141) 
Far-right Populist rule 
 
-0.691* 
  (0.327) 
GDP/capita (log) 0.264 0.242 
 (0.284) (0.276) 
Divided party control -0.0275 -0.0155 
 (0.0426) (0.0355) 
Dem. consolidation 0.00133 0.00213 
 (0.00665) (0.00613) 
Constant -1.487 -1.318 
 (2.532) (2.486) 
N 1129 1129 
Countries 46 46 
Years (avg.) 24.5 24.5 
𝑅2 (within) 0.0882 0.143 
Fixed-effects regression with clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Robustness check 
In order to test the robustness of the results the models are re-run using an alternative fixed- 
effects regression with standard errors clustered by country. The results can be seen in Table 
3. The controls are the same as in the main analysis except for Region, which is excluded as 
only variables that vary over time should be included in fixed-effects regressions. Also, the 
fixed-effects models do not include the lagged version of the dependent variable, this in order 
to avoid potential bias (Nickell, 1981). 
Model 1c in Table 3 uses the same general Populist rule variable as in Table 1 while Model 2c 
tests the direct effect of different kinds of populism just as the regression in Table 2. The 
results of Model 1c confirm those of the main analysis, again having a populist president or 
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prime minister is predicted to increase the level of politicization. The effect, however, is 
larger than the general effect seen in Table 1 and the effects of far-right populist rule in Table 
2. The effects reported in Model 2c are also larger than in the main analysis, but the most 
important difference is that here, it is only the effect of far-right populism that is statistically 
significant, not far-left populism. Overall the robustness test is in line with the findings of the 
main analysis, populist governments seem to increase the level of politicization more than 
non-populists and the direct effect of far-right populist rule seem to be stronger than that of 
other populists in power. 
 
 
 
Discussion of the results 
In this section I discuss the results of the empirical analysis and their implications. The results 
of the main analysis suggest that there is a positive effect of populist rule on the level 
politicization, giving credence to the hypothesis that populists are more inclined than others to 
politicize the bureaucracy. The observed yearly effect is however, as noted in the previous 
section, not very large. The cumulative effect, however, is not negligible and over time the 
norms of the bureaucracy and the ideal of isolating the bureaucracy from politics may be 
eroded. This may lead to shift towards more political control and influence over the 
bureaucracy. This study has not examined to what extent the level of politicization returns to 
normal after populists leave office, but once norms have been changed they may be hard to 
change back as the general trend seems to be towards more politicization rather than less 
(Peters & Pierre, 2004:6). 
The fact that the effect exists but is relatively small suggests that it could be that the populist 
instinct to politicize exists, but the ability of populists to implement large changes is hindered. 
This may be because populists are often political outsiders without previous experience of 
governance, claiming to represent the people and often making a point of not being part of the 
traditional party elite. For example, Peru’s Alberto Fujimori had no political experience 
before seeking the presidency, Hugo Chavéz first became known to the public as one of the 
leaders of a failed coup d'etat, Silvio Berlusconi was a media-mogul and Donald Trump was a 
businessman and reality TV host. Peters and Pierre (2019) have argued that outsider populists 
often lack the necessary skills and experience to take on the institutions that they want to 
change once in power (2019:1527). The bureaucracy, and the state at large, often have strong 
pluralistic institutions that are likely to resist populists attempts at reform and without an 
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organised strategy to take on these institutions, populist governments may struggle to achieve 
the changes they strive for. 
Similarly, Levitsky and Loxton (2013) have also argued that since populist are often 
outsiders, they lack the experience to build coalitions, negotiate, manoeuvre the political 
system and may also lack the perseverance necessary to implement their policies (2013:110- 
11). Institutional experience may help explain why the change in the level of politicization is 
relatively small; some populists may attempt to change the bureaucracy and implement more 
majoritarian direct political control but lack the institutional know-how required to 
successfully carry it out. 
Not all populists are outsiders however, for instance when Victor Orbán took office in 2010 
he had already served as prime minister once before and he and his party had been part of 
Hungarian politics for two decades. But then Hungary is an example where the populist 
government has transformed the civil service and where the level of politicization has 
increased, more on this below. 
The perceived need for politicization may differ depending on what norms are in place when 
populists come to power. The level of politicization may be less affected if it is already 
relatively high, an incoming populist government may be satisfied with the level of 
politization and see less need to increase it further. While for populists in less politicized 
countries where the pluralistic norms are stronger, the perceived need for change may be 
bigger. The data reveals large differences in the mean level of politicization between Latin 
American and European countries. The mean in the sample on the V-Dem Merit criteria 
variable is 1.53 for the Europe and 0.24 for the Latin America. If populists on both sides of 
the Atlantic have the same idea about what ideal level of politicization is, then Europeans may 
need to change the level of politicization in their countries more than their Latin American 
counterparts in order to reach this ideal level, leading to a more dramatic change. 
The ability of populists to implement changes that increase politicization may also be 
dependent on their level of popular support. Ruth (2018) found that in Latin America, when 
populist presidents came into conflict with the legislature over their attempts to erode 
horizontal constraints on their own power, popular support was the deciding factor on which 
their success or failure depended. Presidents who lacked support for their attempts to 
strengthen the presidency and their power over the legislature and judiciary would see their 
reforms stopped or even be impeached by the legislature. Similarly, populist who do not have 
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popular support for their efforts to reshape the bureaucracy may be less successful as their 
efforts are more forcefully opposed by the political opposition as well as members of the 
bureaucracy who feel that they have the public on their side. In such a situation, populist 
actors may be able to place loyalists in some strategic places but be unable to achieve real 
institutional change. 
The second part of the analysis which focused on the direct effect of far-left, centrist and far- 
right populism showed that the two extremes and particularly far-right populism seem to drive 
the results. The direct effects of these ideological leanings are considerably larger than the 
general effect and the predicted effect would lead to a rather dramatic change in the level of 
politicization. 
As mentioned in the Methods section, the data on the ideology of presidents and parties 
comes from different sources for Latin America and Europe, as the Ruth-Lovel et al ‘s (2019) 
dataset is the result of a combination of several existing datasets. Unfortunately, there is a 
discrepancy in the way ideology is treated in the different sources. The coding for Latin 
America by Murillo et al (2010) is only based on economic policy where the far-left- and 
right categories are made up by political actors on the extremes of a left-right scale (see Ruth- 
Lovel et al, 2019:16). Conversely, the coding for Europe, which comes from Rooduijn et al 
(2019), does not categorize the ideology of parties exclusively on their economic policy, 
rather far-right parties are coded as such if they are nativist and authoritarian, regardless of 
their economic policies. Economic policy does play a role for coding parties as far-left parties. 
This means that Panama’s President Mireya Moscoso is coded as far-right based only on her 
economic policies while the classification of the Hungarian Fidesz and Polish PiS parties as 
the same is only based on them being nativist and authoritarian and the classification says 
nothing about their economic policies. Conceptually the Rooduijn et al (2019) definition is 
the closest to the exclusionary right-wing politics described by Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 
(2013) and hence more useful for the analysis. This mismatch of definitions is unfortunate 
and certainly weakens the part of the analysis that focuses on the direct effect of host 
ideology. It is possible that had the same criteria been used for both continents, the division 
by host ideologies would have been different. When I re-run the regression separating the 
sample by region, I find some contrasting results. The host ideology analysis shows that far- 
left- and right populism has about the same effect using the only European sample, but none 
of the two extremes are statistically significant at the 95% level using the Latin American 
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sample (see Table A3 in the Appendix). There are many factors that differ between the two 
regions which may explain this outcome, but it is an indication that the inconsistency of the 
ideology coding may have affected the results. 
This is important to keep in mind when interpreting the results, as well as the fact that the 
analysis is based on a small number of observations as there are relatively few examples of 
fringe-populists in the sample. Only Hungary, Panama and Poland had far-right leaders during 
the time period with a total of 18 far-right populist country-years. While Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Greece, Peru and Venezuela had far-left populist leaders for a total of 50 years. This means 
that individual countries may influence the results heavily, for instance, almost half the 
observations for far-right populism come from Hungary alone. In fact, looking at the 
individual scores of the countries it is obvious that it is Hungary and Poland that is driving the 
effect of far-right populism. The level of politicization in Panama, the third country to be 
coded as far-right populist in the sample, did not change at all during the five-year term of 
President Mireya Moscoso, the politicization levels are stable at the same value for the entire 
25-year time period. This is perhaps an indication that the discrepancies in the ideology 
coding are empirically relevant. 
As for Hungary and Poland, they both start out at about the European average in the 
beginning of the time-series and both countries see rather dramatic changes as far-right 
populists come to power. Hungary scored 1.5 on the Merit criteria scale the year before the 
far-right populist Fidesz party came to power for the second time in 2010, slipped to 0.44 
their first year in office and at the end of the time-series in 2018 the country sores -0.15. 
Poland underwent a similar decline from 1.44 to 0.142 over the last 5 years of the time-series 
under the populist PiS-government. 
On the other side of the ideological spectrum there are also some interesting revelations to be 
found by taking a closer look at the individual country scores of the V-Dem data. Here the 
ideology coding is more consistent as both sources understand far-leftism in economic terms. 
Venezuela, starting out at about the same politicization value as Poland and Hungary under 
centrist populist Rafael Caldera in 1994, has seen a sharp increase in the level of politicization 
over the two decades of far-left populist rule. Starting in Hugo Chávez first year in office, the 
change has continued gradually over the next decades into Maduro’s presidency and in 2017 
it reached -1.497, the lowest value of any country in the sample. In Greece, where 
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politicization is traditionally commonplace, the far-left populist Syriza party’s first three years 
in office lead to a change from -0.032 to -0.782 on the Merit criteria variable. 
However, as for the rest of the far-left populists, the pattern does not continue. When Evo 
Morales first became president of Bolivia there was an initial change from 0.163 to 0.132 his 
first year in office, but after this small change the levels remained the same for the rest of the 
time-series. Both Ecuador and Peru have seen the level of politicization decrease under far- 
left populist leaders. The V-Dem data shows Peru becoming less politicized when the far-left 
populist Humala took over from the centrist populists Garcia and the presidency of Ecuador’s 
Rafael Correa, saw the level of politicization decrease, from -0.045 before he took office to 
0.45 during his two terms as president. So, just as the effect on the far-right side can be 
attributed to Hungary and Poland, among the far-left populist cases, it is only Greece and 
Venezuela that actually see an increase in the level of politicization under far-left populists. 
My expectations that far-left populists would politicize more than other populists because of 
their partiality to more participatory elements of democracy were not supported by the results. 
The results do, however, suggest that host ideology matters. The operationalization used here 
is quite a rough measurement of the inclusionary/exclusionary spectrum and has some 
problems due to the different criteria used for Latin America and Europe. Although it is 
primarily the far-left populists like Chávez and Morales that Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 
(2013) base their analysis on, the operationalization of host ideology used here may exclude 
left-wing inclusionary populists in Latin America not considered far-left by the coding. As 
mentioned above, Nicaragua’s Ortega is coded as centrist rather than far-left but as a leftist he 
and his government may still encompass an inclusionary type of populism. Ruth-Lovell et al 
(2019) comment the fact that they did not find a moderating effect of host ideology on 
democracy by saying that the measurement might need to be more fine-grained in order to 
capture the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of populists. The same may be said here. This also 
means that the results for the centrist category should be treated with caution as it is such a 
diverse group, including many different types of political actors with little in common 
compared to the groups of fringe-populists. 
The observed effect of the far-left and far-right populists calls for some attention, it is 
interesting that there is an effect on both extremes of the political spectrum but not at the 
middle. Of course, this may partly be due to the diversity of the centrist category. On the far- 
right side, the results seem to be driven by Poland and Hungary, two countries whose 
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governing parties are categorised as far-right because they are nativist and authoritarian and 
on the far-left side a lot of the variation comes from Venezuela, a country that has undergone 
a far-reaching process of autocratization since Hugo Chávez first came to power. 
This warrants the question whether intense politicization is mostly a feature of what Bert A 
Rockman (2019) calls populist authoritarianism, i.e. populist governments that use populism 
to legitimise their rule while undermining democratic institutions, rather than populism at 
large? Leaders with authoritarian leanings or full out authoritarian governments do not have 
to lead to more politicization, Singapore for instance, is a well-known example of an 
authoritarian country where meritocracy is well entrenched (Rockman, 2019:1562; Rothstein, 
2011:203-5). Authoritarianism can however, act as an enabler of populist ambitions of 
institutional change. Authoritarian actors may weaken democratic institutions and constraints 
on their own power, facilitating further politicization by enabling greater institutional change 
by undermining the pluralistic norms that resist politicization. The role of authoritarian host 
ideologies is an interesting hypothesis to be explored further in the future. 
 
 
Conclusions 
The general findings of the analysis are that populists in power do seem to increase the level 
of politicization more than non-populists (Hypothesis 1). This effect was statistically 
significant and was borne out in the robustness test as well. Previously, not much has been 
known about the relationship between populists in power and the bureaucracy, this study has 
begun to fill this gap. The results of this study points in the expected direction and suggest 
that populists in power may increase the level of politicization and over time populist rule 
may lead to a shift in the norms that govern the public bureaucracy. 
Considering that populism is on the rise in many countries across the world and what is 
known about the relationship between politicization and the quality of government these 
findings are important. Political control and accountability are a necessary part of democratic 
governance, but intense politicization may damage the bureaucracy’s legitimacy and 
performance as well as the quality of government. 
The expectation that populists who come into power will try to take control of the 
bureaucracy, politicize it and purge it from pluralist ideals implies a fast and dramatic process, 
however the results seen here are more modest. As the observed yearly effect is not very large 
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and may not radically change a country’s relative level of politicization, at least not very fast. 
However, it can have an affect over time and as norms change the equilibrium between 
politics and merit may shift. Once changed, such a shift may prove hard to reverse. This 
means that the results warrant further attention to the quality of government implications of 
the current populist trend. 
The results for far-right populists, however, are more in line with the idea of a swift change. 
This can be seen in the second part of the analysis, studying the direct effect of far-left, 
centrist and far-right populist rule. These results indicate that the effect of populist rule is 
driven by populists on the fringes of the left-right spectrum, particularly the far-right. The 
analysis showed no significant effect of the largest of the groups of host ideology, the diverse 
centrist category. The expectation that the more inclusionary far-left populists would increase 
the level of politicization more than other populists (Hypothesis 2) was not supported by the 
results. Rather, the effect of far-right populism is stronger than that of far-left populism. 
The different effect of host ideologies is an interesting finding, even if the results should be 
treated with caution due to the lack of consistency of the coding and the relatively small 
number of observations. The findings do suggest however, that the role of host ideology is 
something that future studies could benefit from exploring. This would further the debate on 
inclusionary and exclusionary populism and their properties as well as shed more light on the 
role of populist authoritarianism in politicization. 
The aim of this thesis has been to examine the notion that populist in power politicize the 
bureaucracy, which had been suggested but not tested in earlier works in the field. Using a 
combination of different data sources and a quantitative approach the thesis has been able to 
provide an empirical test and find support for the idea that populists in power do increase the 
level of politicization more than others. These findings lends support to the theory that 
populism’s majoritarian and anti-elite sentiments makes populist actors more inclined to use 
appointments to the bureaucracy as a means of control, in order to implement their agenda 
and to reduce pluralistic and “elite” influences on the state. 
As populisms seems to be here to stay, the indication that populists in power furthers 
politicization may be an important issue to explore for future studies. This thesis’ quantitative 
analysis has been able to empirically establish a pattern. Future studies could gain by studying 
individual populist governments, how they politicize as well as why some populists may not. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Summary statistics 
 
Variable Observations Mean SD Min. Max. Source 
Politicization- 
Merit criteria 
1129 1.035841 1.059039 -1.497 2.987 Pemstein 
et al, 
2019 
Populism 1129 .1231178 .328718 0 1 Ruth- 
Lovel et 
al. 2019 
Populist host 
ideology 
1129 .2054916 ..6104338 0 3 Ruth- 
Lovel et 
al. 2019 
GDP/cap 
(Log) 
1129 9.52496 1.066184 6.969278 11.62597 World 
Bank, 
2020 
Divided 
Government 
1129 .0685855 .8421876 -1.631 1.695 Coppedge 
et al, 
2020 
Democratic 
consolidation 
1129 33.26395 27.91399 0 138 Marshall 
et al, 
2019 
Region 1129 .3861825 .487089 0 1 Ruth- 
Lovel et 
al. 2019 
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Table A2. List of countries by populist host ideology, country-years 
 
Country name Non-populist Far-left 
populism 
Centrist 
populism 
Far-right 
populism 
Total 
Argentina 16 0 9 0 25 
Austria 25 0 0 0 25 
Belgium 25 0 0 0 25 
Bolivia 13 12 0 0 25 
Brazil 25 0 0 0 25 
Bulgaria 13 0 12 0 25 
Chile 25 0 0 0 25 
Colombia 25 0 0 0 25 
Costa Rica 25 0 0 0 25 
Croatia 19 0 0 0 19 
Cyprus 25 0 0 0 25 
Czech 
Republic 
24 0 1 0 25 
Denmark 25 0 0 0 25 
Dominican 
Republic 
21 0 4 0 25 
Ecuador 12 10 3 0 25 
El Salvador 25 0 0 0 25 
Estonia 23 0 2 0 25 
Finland 25 0 0 0 25 
France 25 0 0 0 25 
Germany 25 0 0 0 25 
Greece 22 3 0 0 25 
Guatemala 23 0 0 0 23 
Honduras 25 0 0 0 25 
Hungary 17 0 0 8 25 
Ireland 25 0 0 0 25 
Italy 16 0 9 0 25 
Latvia 22 0 3 0 0 
Lithuania 24 0 0 0 24 
Luxemburg 25 0 0 0 25 
Mexico 25 0 0 0 25 
Netherlands 25 0 0 0 25 
Nicaragua 13 0 12 0 25 
Norway 25 0 0 0 25 
Panama 20 0 0 5 25 
Paraguay 25 0 0 0 25 
Peru 3 5 5 0 13 
Poland 20 0 0 5 25 
Portugal 25 0 0 0 25 
Romania 25 0 0 0 25 
Slovakia 25 0 0 0 25 
Slovenia 25 0 0 0 25 
Spain 25 0 0 0 25 
Sweden 25 0 0 0 25 
United 
Kingdom 
25 0 0 0 25 
Uruguay 25 0 0 0 25 
Venezuela 0 20 5 0 25 
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Table A3. Populist rule and politicization - Separate analysis by region 
 
 (1-Europe) (2-Latin 
America) 
(3-Europe) (4-Latin 
America) 
Merit criteria     
Populist rule -0.0949** -0.0276+ 
  
 (0.0344) (0.0152)   
Far-left Populist rule 
  
-0.291* -0.0433+ 
   (0.140) (0.0241) 
Centrist Populist rule 
  
-0.000563 -0.000480 
   (0.0328) (0.0196) 
Far-right Populist rule 
  
-0.213*** 0.0109 
   (0.0627) (0.0101) 
 
Merit criteria (t-1) 
 
0.986*** 
 
0.995*** 
 
0.983*** 
 
0.991*** 
 (0.00929) (0.00794) (0.00955) (0.00790) 
GDP/capita (log) 0.00222 -0.00431 0.00873 -0.00127 
 (0.0130) (0.00894) (0.0128) (0.00888) 
Divided party control 0.00327 -0.00513 -0.0000779 -0.00371 
 (0.00876) (0.00389) (0.00890) (0.00414) 
Dem. Consolidation -0.0000109 0.000106 -0.0000813 0.000181 
 (0.000112) (0.000216) (0.000112) (0.000218) 
 
Constant 
 
0.00778 
 
0.0337 
 
-0.0521 
 
0.00531 
 (0.123) (0.0796) (0.121) (0.0798) 
N 693 436 693 436 
Countries 28 18 28 18 
Years (avg.) 24.75 24.22 24.75 24.22 
𝑅2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Ordinary least squares regression with panel-corrected standard-errors in parentheses. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
